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Fighting
with the Contras
by Rob Krott
A GREEN AMERICAN VOLUNTEER JOINS THE WAR AGAINST THE
SANDINISTAS
JANUARY 10,1985, NICARAO BASE, A REAR-AREA CONTRA
CAMP NEAR THE HONDURAN BORDER TOWN OF LA LADOSA
Billy Joe Johnson, an American volunteer from Birmingham,
Alabama is being questioned by two English speaking
FDN (Fuerza Democatica Nicaraguense) officers.
"What is the gringo doing here?" "Volunteering
to help you guys,"says Billy Joe.
The officers radio their headquarters for instructions.
Only two days after arriving at the Contra camp, Bill
met Juan O. Tomayo, a staff reporter from The Miami
Herald. Tomayo promptly wrote "The Short, Happy
Life of America's Boy-Man: a Hemingway Fantasy Comes
Alive in a Nicaraguan Guerrilla Camp." Tomayo
chose the title because they had discussed a short
story, "The Short, Happy Life of Francis Macomber"
by Ernest Hemingway, and its significance to Johnson
(he had a well-thumbed copy of The Complete Short
Stories of Ernest Hemingway with him). In Hemingway's
story the white hunter, Robert Wilson, dismisses his
wealthy client, Francis Macamber, and other American
men as protected, coddled "bay-men' who never
come of age because they lead secure lives without
risk or danger. As Johnson says now, "It's pretty
obvious from the article he wrote just how wet behind
the ears I was.'
Wet behind the ears he was. At the time he was described
by Tomayo as "a strapping 6-foot-3, 25 year old
with the soft voice, wheat colored hair innocent-wide
blue eyes, and a stubby reddish beard barely covering
a lantern jaw that looks as if it were drawn for a
Super Heroes comic strip character."
His only military experience was a brief stint in
ROTC during college, a small Jesuit school where he
earned a BS in chemistry. He interned with a surgeon
after college preparatory to medical school but dropped
out to travel around the world, including a four-month
journey across the African continent, looking for
adventure. Later, equipped with a map of Mexico and
Central America torn from a National Geographic magazine,
and $1,000 cash, he jumped a bus to Laredo, Texas,
hopped a train to Mexico City, then traveled to Guatemala
City by bus (on the bus to Guatemala City he met an
American leftist traveling to Managua to work for
the Sandinistas).
From Guatemala City, by another bus, he made his way
into the FDN's supposedly clandestine Nicarao Base
by stopping Honduran peasants along the way and asking
"Contras?"
On his fourth day at the base he told Tomayo, "I
hope they let me stay and help."
The
next day FDN headquarters sent a message to the commandante
of Nicarao. "Tell the gentleman, that while we
are thankful for his offer, we don't accept foreign
participants. Advise him, politely but firmly, to
leave the base."
Johnson trudged up the hill to the green plastic tent
where he'd shivered through the last two nights in
the mountains of Nicaragua and sadly packed his meager
belongings. Before he left Nicarao, he talked to an
English-speaking FDN officerwho thought Johnson would
be an asset at the base. As Johnson departed for his
trip back to Honduras, the officer waved and shouted,
"See you soon.'
Johnson returned to Tegucigalpa, Honduras with Juan
Tomayo. On the way he told him, "I guess it's
kind of hard to just walk into a war."
In Tegucigalpa he went to the FDN headquarters, where
he met Mario Calero. Calero was impressed with the
young American, and because there weren't any boots
in the Contra inventory to fit Johnson, Calero gave
Bill his own boots. Heartened by this, Johnson returned
Nicarao.
During his eight months with the Contras, Johnson
would get caught up in a major combat action, at a
place called Chamascada. At Chamascada, a small, battle-weary
band of 70 Contras suffered through daily rocket barrages
and held off repeated attacks of Cuban-led Nicaraguan
army battalions.
When Johnson returned to the Contra rear area, he
encountered a concerned and furious Contra commander,
who was determined that an American volunteer was
not going to get killed while the United States Congress
was voting on Contra Aid appropriations. Johnson was
allowed to stay, but only if he spent his time working
in the rear as a medic. The former med student soon
found himself doctoring wounded Contras and treating
the usual 100 or so daily cases of dysentery. But
before his unglamorous transfer to "the rear,'
Johnson got some of what he was looking for at a Contra
radio relay point on a hilltop called Chamascada.
This is his story. -RK
0900 21 JAN 1985: A Monday, I arrived back at the
base camp at Nicarao. Far off in the distance, I could
hear explosions which I assumed to be some kind of
artillery fire. "Those boys have been partying
like that for ten straight days," said the camp's
doctor, who spoke near fluent English. He told me
he thought the FDN was shelling the Sandinistas. The
Doc was leaving with a supply run to the front in
the morning on what he called a "morale visit"
and offered to show me the war "close up"
if I wanted
0600 22 JAN: The morning of the supposed supply run,
Cornmandante "4-2" suggests I draw a weapon
and ammo from supply, because "we're dropping
mortars on them because they are attacking us. Best
to be on the safe side, amigo." Fine by me. I
didn't exactly relish the thought of being unarmed
in a combat zone, even if we weren't going to be all
that close to the front.
Our destination was a defensive position (actually
a fortified radio relay station) about six clicks
inside Nicaragua called "Chamascada." I
thought it might be a real good idea to go into Nicaragua
armed. Since I wasn't a weapons expert, I was initially
overwhelmed at the prospect of choosing a weapon from
the pile. [The FDN had a wide variety of weapons:
FN-FALs, German Heckler & Koch G-3s, the usual
US stuff like M-14s, M-16s, Ml Garands, and Ml carbines,
and a hodgepodge of Mausers, Uzis, Egyptian-made Swedish
K's, 9mm subguns (aka the Port Said), and of course
AK-47s, AKMs, and RPKs.]
My choices narrowed when I quickly discovered that
most of the weapons were either poorly maintained,
old (rusting FNs from the 1950s), or lacked ammunition.
Many of the rifles had shot-out bores. I finally settled
on an AKM, mainly because it still had some rifling
left in the barrel and I was fairly certain I could
pick up more ammo (scavenged from the battlefield
if necessary). My particular AKM (like most combloc
weapons) was captured. Part of the wooden fore-end
was chipped away. "Grenade," said one of
the Contras. I smiled wanly, shouldered my "new
Kalashnikov assault rifle and hoped I would have better
luck with it than its previous owner.
Besides
the weapon, I was issued 300 rounds of ammo, four
Brazilian fragmentation hand grenades and a six-round
bandoleer of 40mm grenades for our M203 and M79 grenade
launchers. I began to wonder just how close "up
close" really was. We started at 0800 after the
typical meal of frijoles con arroz (beans with rice),
tortillas, and thick, heavily sugared Honduran coffee.
Altogether there were six of us; four Contras ages
13-20, the doctor, and myself. Since this was basically
a re-supply mission, we were also humping in 2000
rounds of NATO 7.62mm ammo, 1000 rounds of 7.62x39mm
ammo for the Kalashnikovs, 24 40mm grenades, and 30
hand grenades. This was supposed to be a four or five
day supply of ammo for the guys we were re-supplying.
What size unit was this, I wondered. A squad? If our
six-man group got hit in an ambush, we'd blow this
much stuff off in a matter of minutes. Well, we would
if I had anything to do about it.
The boys informed me that the trip to Chamascada normally took
them about four hours, emphasizing that it was all uphill. Man,
they weren't kidding. In some places the grade was nearly 75 degrees
and you had to use handholds hacked into the side of the mountain.
The Doc and I thought we were in fairly good physical condition,
but a combination of the climbing and the thin air (the altitude
was 1500+ meters) was kicking our asses. When we left we optimistically
thought we would make it to Chamascada by lunchtime. Now we were
hoping we wouldn't have to spend the night camped on the trail.
Besides the weight of the ammo, one of the things slowing us down
was the thick jungle growth which had replaced the cultivated fields
and coffee plantations of the lowlands.
About 1400 that day we stopped at "Quinientos," an intermediate
camp on the route to the front. Quinientos was just a group of eight
or ten of the ubiquitous tree branch and sheet plastic "hooches"
the Contras used for shelter. The camp was out in the open and totally
exposed. We had stopped to eat and while waiting for "lunch"
to be served were entertained by Contra war stories. One of the
guys started telling a typical Contra "No-shit there-I-was."
Most Contra war stories centered around the poor soldierly qualities
of the cowardly Sandinistas. This story had a unique twist, though.
The storyteller mentioned that he really feared the Sandinistas'
Cuban advisors.
This Contra firmly believed that it was impossible to kill a Cuban
with a bullet. Killing a Cuban required a rocketeither a LAW or
an RPG. Other Contras I spoke to said they also believed this, and
some said that many of the dead Cubans were found with little "Voodoo
pouches" containing birds feet, lizard tails, balls of hair,
and other Voodoo paraphernalia. The doctor said he'd heard the same
out on the coast, but like me, had assigned rumors such as the "Voodoo
Cubans" to the "for further investigation" category.
(Note: It is possible that these dead Cubans were practitioners
of Santeria, a Voodoo type religion common in Cuba, Central America,
and the Caribbean.)
Like the day before, the heavy artillery barrages were continuous,
and as we marched we got closer and closer to the area being shelled.
A few minutes after we halted we heard what sounded like firefights,
a sudden crescendo of heavy automatic weapons fire, in at least
two spots farther up the trail. The firing continued off and on
for about half an hour, and after a few minutes of silence we heard
a loud blast.
When I mentioned that I wasn't altogether happy about walking into
a possible ambush up ahead, the Contras assured me that this was
usual for the front and everything was basically okay. I remained
unconvinced until I noticed that one of the Contras had left some
of his armament behind and was now armed with only a single grenade
and a sack of chicken eggs.
About thirty minutes later we encountered seven wounded Contras
returning from Chamascada. They'd been caught in the open by a rocket
which wounded all of them. One of the walking wounded, about 50
years old by the look of him, was thrown 10 or 15 feet by the blast,
and though he had no visible wounds (though he seemed to be suffering
from concussive injuries) he was violently engaged in projectile
vomiting as a result of shock. Though none of the wounded appeared
seriously injured, the doctor checked out each man, and after he
was satisfied with the medic's work we pushed on.
Chamascada Base was a well-entrenched position situated high atop
a ridge which ran north to south. The westerly slope was pasture,
clear of any trees, unlike the heavy growth we had been climbing
through for most of the day. We met the commander, a 20-year-old
Contra code named "Commanche," who seemed to be very much
in control of the situation. His area of operations encompassed
the ridge where the main body of his force was dug-in, and three
ambush or support positions located about 500-1000 meters away from
the main position on the ridge's east, west, and south spurs. Each
of the outposts was manned by a dozen men and communicated with
Comanche's CP and the main base if needed via hand-held radios.
Thirty men were dug in along the ridge-lines with partial overhead
cover. This was the front line. To push the Contras back into Honduras
the Sandinistas would have to attack up the steep barren western
slope right into the guns of the Contras. It would be suicidal.
Comanche had a great defensive position. I was about to say something
about it when I noticed that fully one third of the Contras were
armed with decrepit bolt action Mausers of uncertain ancestry. Well,
I thought, maybe they make up for their lack of modern small arms
with esprit. You need guts and a real hatred of communism to fight
Kalashnikovs with bolt actions.
Comanche's men were a beat up looking bunch. He told me, "This
is the eighth straight day of combat and the twelfth straight day
of rocket attacks for these men. Today, the piriacuacos (literally
rabid dogs, the standard Contra epithet for their enemies) pounded
us all morning long with the rocket launcher (Soviet BM2 1 multiple
rocket launcher) and then in the afternoon, attacked. The boys are
in good spirits because they routed the attack so thoroughly that
some of them actually left the trenches and chased them down the
bill. They were still celebrating when they sent one well-placed
rocket.., which explains the wounded men you probably ran into on
the way here.., ordinarily we don't have casualties from the rockets.
The Sandinistas lost 17 dead in that attack. Seven on the crest
of the ridgeline near the trenches. Some of the Contras were unceremoniously
heaving the bodies down the hillside when we arrived. I asked Commandante
Comanche, "How did the Sandinistas manage to get so close to
your position? You can obviously see them coming from a long way
away."
Comanche said, "There are two reasons: 1) We are very short
of ammunition, and 2) We have the piriacuacos' radio frequency.
After a heavy rocket at-tack we invariably hear their Cuban advisors
telling them 'go take the hill. ..they've abandoned their position.'
Of course we don't make them think otherwise until they are right
at the trenches.. .we get maximum kills that way. Two days ago the
Cubans told another group the same thing. Those poor bastards came
up the bill with their AKs on their shoulders, laughing, and with
their radios playing. We nailed 34 that day." (I must have
looked a little skeptical, because he quickly pulled out a wad of
Sandinista ID cards as proof). Our conversation continued...
"How do you know it's Cubans giving the orders?"
"You can tell by their accents, mostly, and the excited way
they talk. They let too much of that propaganda go to their heads."
The wind shifted and I noticed the smell of the putrefying dead
bodies baking in the hot Central American sun just a few meters
down the hillside. "You never bury the dead. You always, ahhh,
'dispose' of them down the hill? I was just wondering, because the
smell here is pretty bad."
"Well, every time those guys attack they have to pass by all
those bodies. Hell, some of them are just skeletons now. It's just
a little psychological warfare, eh, to have what could happen to
you so vividly depicted right before your eyes just as you're trying
to work up some courage."
I nodded my head. This guy was barely out of his teens and he knew
what he was doing. I looked around and then asked him, "I thought
the FDN was fighting a guerrilla war. Isn't defending positions
like this conventional warfare tactics?"
"Yes, you're correct on that point, but this is a strategic
position for the FDN. Chamascada provides an important radio link
between Nicarao and our forces operating deep inside Nicaragua.
Also, this position protects our main infiltration routes in this
area. It's not a very hard position to defend anyway. You can see
how steep the approaches are, and the Sandinistas always attack
from the open side. From down in the valley where they start their
attack, they have to climb 400 meters straight up. They don't have
much fight left in them after a climb like that."
Comanche told me the worst part about defending Chamascada was that
since the Sandinistas knew their exact location, the Contras were
under constant rocket bombardment. Even though they were dug in,
the experience of being under constant bombardment made everyone
edgy and restricted the Contras to their holes. Besides the usual
morale problems, the Contras were especially frustrated because
their standard operating procedure as a guerrilla force was to pick
up and move once the Sandinistas located them and fired them up.
By the first salvo of rocket fire the Contras were usually long
gone. They weren't trained or prepared for this static defensive
warfare under constant rocket attack. The upside was that they were
taking a fearsome toll on the Sandinista attack force. I told Comanche
there'd been a great deal of criticism in the US press about the
FDN's ability to hold territory. From the well-fortified trenches
and the sleeping huts it looked like they'd been holding Chamascada
for awhile.
"Thirteen months," said Comanche.
As it turned dark Comanche showed us the best part of defending
Chamascada at nightthe view. From the high altitude of the ridge
the lights of about 10 cities were visible, including Estelli about
70 kilometers away. The wind was blowing at a steady 40 kph, and
I quickly checked the temperature. It was -bC. The cold ate straight
through our fatigued bodies, and Comanche showed us to our hut.
The hooches were of the usual stick and plastic sheeting variety,
which didn't promise much in the way of shelter from anything except
the wind. I didn't think I'd be sleeping much anyway, especially
when Doe pointed out the numerous shrapnel holes dotting the plastic.
"I wouldn't worry about those rockets, they need observers
to spot for them and the observers need light," said Comanche,
"they do, however, attack at night, but we'll let you know
if anything comes up." Right!
The next day was quiet but was filled with an air of expectation.
After eight straight days of fighting, you begin to think attacking
daily may have become habit forming for the Sandinistas. In the
morning the Doe saw "patients." This included virtually
everyone on the ridge. Only two men were actually ill. Everyone
else just had non-specific aches and pains. They weren't actually
malingering...it just seemed like they wanted to see the Doc as
a break from the monotony and to bitch and moan a little. One of
the Contras complained of "cold feet." I had a little
laugh at that when it was translated. I was curious to see what
the Doe was going to pull out of his bag to warm up the guy's toes,
when he told me that on a morale medical mission everybody got "treated"
even if it was only a handful of salt tablets given as placebos.
At lunch time the next day we were lit with three rockets. There's
a sonic boom as each rocket snaps overhead followed by the explosion
when it hits. Add the typical "whoosh" of incoming to
that and it'll put the fear of the Lord into anyone. No wonder the
Contras here looked so shell-shocked. The Contras said this attack
was just harassing fire, since the rockets overshot Chamascada by
a good 500 meters. The general consensus among the defenders was
that, mananatomorrow, we'd be hit with an all-out ground attack.
The prevailing wisdom was correct. At 0600 the Sandinistas started
dropping mortar rounds on Chamascada. The Doc said they bracketed
the hilltop, and seemed to be zeroing in on the southern outpost.
It was an ideal morning for a ground attack. The hazy morning fog
hanging in the hills limited our vision to about 50 meters to our
front. We waited expectantly in our trenches, eyes straining in
vain to penetrate the enveloping fog. Comanche's radio man began
picking up situation reports from Sandinista commanders giving their
positions in the clear. One of the attacking ground commanders gave
his location as being only 150 meters to our front. We braced ourselves
for the coming onslaught.
A loud Cacophony of fire broke out near the southern outpost. The
firefight was furious and sustained, lasting about five minutes.
Sporadic, isolated shots were heard throughout the next hour. The
commander of the southern outpost reported halting an attack by
a large Sandinista force. Back up on the ridgeline we were wondering
whether the main body of the attack was just down the foggy slope
waiting to attack or whether they got lost in the fog and hit the
southern outpost by mistake. Maybe the attack wouldn't come; maybe
the Sandinista commandante needed map reading lessons.
But with the fog as thick and cloying as it was, we didn't take
any chances and remained at 100 percent security-full alert. About
1500 th at afternoon the fog lifted, confirming our opinions of
commandante bad azimuth's military orienteering skills.
The next day was sunny and quiet, a thankful respite after nine
hours of fearful apprehension wondering if we're going to get pushed
off the ridge line by the Sandinistas. Two consecutive sleepless
nights had left us all exhausted and we spent the day catching up
on our sleep. Later that afternoon, we sat around eating roasted
corn and engaging in a favorite Chamascada pastime - watching the
circling vultures riding the mountain thermals down to a spot on
the hillside below. The troops were watching with more interest
than I thought the activity really merited, until they pointed out
that some of the vultures had landed in different locations than
usual. This usually meant fresh dead and more war booty, so a hastily
organized patrol departed immediately to make a reconnaissance.
While they were gone someone turned on a transistor radio and we
listened to Billy Joel sing, "It's not the real thing, it's
just a fantasy." How appropriate I thought, but I wouldn't
realize just how true that was until later. About an hour, the recon
patrol returned with two Kalashnikovs and a medical kit. There'd
been more, but the patrol thought they'd been spotted by Sandinista
observer, so they cleared the area before they were hit by the dreaded
rockets. The Doc inspected the medical kit which turned out to be
East German, complete with a German language first aid manual sans
pictures, and a large quantity of chloroquine phosphate tablets.
According to Doc, chloroquine is used to treat malaria. Since there
wasn't any malaria in this region, the Sandinistas were rumored
to pop chloroquine to get high before an assault. If so there are
probably some hurtin' Sandinista vets today because chloroquine
in excessive dosages causes eye and liver damage.
Late in the day Comanche received a radio communiqué ordering him
to Nicarao for mission coordination. Comanche decided it would be
a good idea for the Doc and Ito return with him. We weren't exactly
happy with his decision and we were sorely disappointed we hadn't
seen more action. The next day was another quiet morningno rockets,
no mortars. This only served to reassure Comanche that Chamascada
would be okay without him during his trip to the rear. Comanche,
the Doc, myself, and one Contra for added security left at 0730
for the long march back to Nicarao. We were only 15 minutes down
the trail when the Sandinistas mortared Chamascada. They only fired
three rounds, none of which were close to any of the defensive positions.
Comanche said the Sandinistas target registration was an ominous
sign of an impending attack. Comanche returned to his unit. The
Doc and I were actually happy we weren't going to miss the action.
When we arrived back in Chamascada the radio operator breathlessly
informed his commander that radio intercepts indicated the arrival
of three fresh enemy battalions with a total estimated strength
of 2,500 men in the area. We continued to monitor the enemy's radio
traffic which consisted mostly of commanders reporting their units'
positions.
Things were beginning to look pretty grim for the defenders of Chamascada.
Comanche radioed Nicarao with an urgent request for reinforcements
and an ammunition re-supply. Best case scenario for receiving help
was reinforcements arriving in four or five hours. If we were attacked
any time soon we'd have to hold out for at least that long or bug
out. Comanche ordered a redistribution of ammunition.
Everyone had about 200 rounds to his name. Things weren't looking
very good and the rest of the morning was spent listening to the
increasing Sandinista radio trafficSometime around noon one of our
observation posts (OPs) spotted a large enemy force moving toward
the ridge, just as a message from the Sandinistas rocket battery
commander was heard stating the rockets were loaded and "listo"
(ready). Every time we heard the command "Listo!" we knew
the rockets were on their way and would impact in about 20 to 30
seconds. Just in case our radio monitor missed that call, the battery
also sent "cinco" or "diez" to indicate how
many rockets were inbound. [Kind of a "shot, out" and
"shot, over" system for their ground maneuver unit commanders
and the forward observers or spotters.]
The Contras' interceptions of Sandinista transmissions kept casualties
to a minimum. In the next two hours, our position was pounded with
over 80 rockets. At 1400 the barrage was lifted, and we monitored
the Sandinista order to attack. Other radio intercepts indicated
the Sandinistas were confident this attack would succeed; their
commanders were planning to secure Chamascada and bivouac for the
night. Our reinforcements still hadn't showed, and I looked back
towards Honduras, wondering where I was going to be tonight.. .wondering
if I would still be alive.
Comanche was confident despite the fact that his under strength
company was almost out of ammo and was going to go toe-to-toe with
a reinforced brigade with artillery in direct support. Maybe he
was just trying to be a good leader and keep appearances up for
the men. It looked like Custer's Last Stand to me. I didn't have
much time to worry about all this because the Sandinistas had crept
forward under cover of the rocket attack and I was crouched down
in the trench line as automatic weapons fire stitched the air overhead.
You could hear the whip-snap of the bullets.
The whole trench line opened up in a violent fusillade of automatic
weapons fire and 40mm grenades; we unloaded our weapons furiously
down the hill in the direction of the attackers. Contras were heaving
grenades as fast as they could pull the pins and clacking off the
Claymore mines.
It was a stereotypical "mad minute." The guy next to the
Doc and me was an M60 gunner. He burned off a few rounds and the
gun jammed. He popped the feed tray cover and frantically tried
to clear the stoppage, unsuccessfully, and then threw both of his
grenades and then grabbed two more, one of Doc's and one of mine.
He let them fly and then burned off about 80 rounds from his FN-FALall
in about a minute's time. Besides his poor fire control, his rifle
marksmanship wasn't all that great either...most of the firing was
done with the weapon held over his head with his eyes closed and
his tongue sticking out the side of his mouth. I couldn't blame
him, even as I was steadily banging away with my Kalashnikov I couldn't
help but flinch from all the rounds whizzing by.
Doc was popping up out of his hole like a jack-in-the-box to burn
off short bursts, so I just followed his lead, alternating with
him putting out rounds and myself...controlled semi-auto fire, pausing
only to change a magazine and check the antics of the Contra sharing
my position. I wanted to make sure he was at least getting the muzzle
of the FN over the lip of our trench.
We were catching hell from the attacking Sandinistas. All the outposts
as well as the main position were being hit, and hit hard. If this
kept up, and with the lack of anything resembling fire control (if
I could use the Contra sharing my hole as an example), we were going
to be out of ammo and overrun very soon. Then I remembered that
fully one-third of Comanche's men were armed with bolt action Mausers.
If they were putting out a steady stream of suppressive fire we
might be able to hold them off. Hopefully, the heavy outpouring
of automatic weapons fire from our defenses would give us initial
fire superiority and slow the Sandinistas assault.
The Sandinista attack stalled; miraculously we'd held them off.
Within the hour the firing tapered off, and we were optimistically
thinking that the Sandinistas had hung it up for the day. Reinforcements
loaded down with extra ammunition would reach us later that night,
and all would be well. Wrong answer! Fifteen minutes later we heard
"Listo!" crackle over the radio and quickly ate dirt from
the bottom of our holes. We took a full barrage of 30 rockets. One
struck just outside my trench. The force of the blast picked me
up, turned me over, and slammed me to the bottom of the trench.
The hill was enveloped in a cloud of dust and smoke, and we were
all dazed and shaken, our ears ringing.
I lay in the bottom of my hole wishing my wood and metal Kalashnikov
was big enough to crawl under. I had just gained a new and healthy
respect for the Soviet BM-21.
The radio soon crackled to life again with
a Cuban voice and the ubiquitous, "Go take the
hill... .They've abandoned their positions." It
was quickly translated for me and I couldn't help but
smile a little. By now the word had gotten out on this
joker, and the Sandinistas weren't buying it anymore.
The Contras fired 'em up with a volley of 40mm grenades
as they started up the hill, and they turned back.
By now we were certain that the last desultory attack
was it for the day. Then Comanche told us the bad news.
The southern outpost had been overrun. With the dismounted
avenue of approach up the spur on our southern flank
undefended, we were in trouble.
Comanche wasn't sure if we could hold the ridge without
our southern support position, and he didn't have enough
men for a counter-attack. Comanche ordered the doctor
and I to return to Nicarao. A shell-shocked Contra who
had broken and ran during the rocket barrage was to
guide us.
We had to sprint about 300 meters along the ridgeline
totally exposed to Sandinista fire and then hope the
Sandinistas hadn't worked in behind us and set up ambushes
or stop-groups between us and Quinientos. Of course
the Sandinistas spotted us and began throwing rockets
along the trail. Most were over-shots but close enough
to make me sweat. They tore up the trail and the surrounding
jungle, knocking down trees and cratering the landscape,
making our movement difficultOur ex-filtration made
the Sandinistas think all the Contras were bugging out
and they promptly renewed their assault. We started
catching automatic fire over our heads as we ran.
I don't know if it was stray rounds or if we were receiving
fire from a long distance ambush. Between the incoming
rockets and the rifle fire, our "guide" disappeared.
We made it to safety and staggered on down the muddy
trail in the approaching darkness towards Quinientos.
We were met by the recently arrived reinforcements who
had halted rather than approach Chamascada at night.
I think they were a little nervous about the heavy rocket
fire also. I laughed when our "guide" walked
up to Doc and complained about the rockets upsetting
his stomach. I looked at Doc and said, "What do
you want to give this guy besides a good, swift kick
in the ass?"
Doc grinned at me, winked, and reached into his medical
kit pulling out a syringe with a dull, large-gauge needle
and promptly gave our buddy a large shot of water in
the ass.
Comanche and his men staggered into Quinientos around
2100. With their ammunition nearly gone, the southern
outpost overrun, and no sign of help, he knew his chances
of holding Chamascada through the night were zero. He
ordered a night withdrawal. Miraculously none of his
men were serious casualties. In the morning, radio intercepts
indicated that the Sandinistas had five reluctant infantry
companies in attack positions below Chamascada. Sometime
around 0800 we heard the first incoming rockets hitting
our abandoned positions. I guess sometime later in the
day the Sandinistas attacked and found what their Cuban
advisors had been saying for weeks was truethere really
was no one there.
Four weeks after Johnson left Chamascada and the Contras
were forced to withdraw, Comanche led the attack to
retake the ridgeline. He was badly wounded in the wrist,
the bullet penetrating his watch and severing the tendons.
Johnson, meanwhile, had returned to Nicarao, where he
was ordered to stick to medical duties in the rear lest
he become a casualty or worse, get captured.
He worked as a medic at Nicarao and later at another
camp near La Paraiso. In his opinion, one of his biggest
contributions was the morale boast that he as an American
gave the Contras. He served as physical proof that Americans
cared about the future of democracy in Nicaragua. He
also helped explain the American political process to
them and why more help wasn't forthcoming.
Johnson later met Tom Posey, head of the CMA (Civilian
Military Assistance), and received some support from
him. Johnson was an unpaid volunteer during his eight
months with the Contras but received $585 in expense
money from Mario Calero. During his stay he rubbed shoulders
with some of the major players in the Contra Aid game
and some of the really good guys like Jim Tumey and
Dr. Chuck McHugh, as well as whackos like Sam Hall.
Now, nine years later and a lot older and wiser, Bill
Johnson reflects on his days with the Contras almost
nostalgically. "...I got a real high just from
being associated with thousands of men who believed
in something, something bigger than themselves, something
they were prepared to fight and die for. Where can you
find commitment like that in America?"
This story is dedicated to a Canadian volunteer, Peter
Bertlie, KIA on a mission deep in Sandinista held Nicaragua.
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